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Abstract: 
In past few years, corporate scandals and bankruptcy in US and Europe and other parts of the 
world show some certain evidence on weak corporate governance, weak internal control 
system and weak audit. Though there are a few researches which have been done in the field 
of international corporate governance standards, we believe that this field with more rooms to 
explore. Therefore, this paper chooses a different analytical approach and among its aims is to 
give some systematic opinions. 
First, it classifies European Group representative corporate governance (CG) standards into 
two (2) groups: EASD and ECODA CG principles covered in group 1 and, group 2, including 
EFAMA Code and Corporate Practices from EBRD, so-called relative good CG group, while 
it uses ACCA and CFA principles as reference. 
Second, it , through analysis, shows differences between above set of standards which are and 
have been used as reference principles for many relevant organizations. 
Third, it establishes a selected comparative set of standards for European group representative 
corporate governance system in accordance to international standards.  
Last but not least, this paper covers some ideas and policy suggestions. 
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1. Introduction 
The nature of the environment in which contemporary businesses function is systemic which 
is described in corporate governance practices or codes.   
 
The Bulgarian 2012 Code for Corporate Governance mentioned corporate governance is 
understood as the relations between the boards, shareholders, and stakeholders of the 
company. Over years, the Code has been effective in public companies. In the light of 
different views on Corporate Governance and Company Acts, which are among interests of 
many organizations, after financial crisis 2007-2009, this paper mainly concentrates on 
analysis of Code of Best Practices for Corporate Governance in selected European groups and 
separates it from the analysis of relevant Company Act and Accounting regulations, which 
can be used as reference for further scopes. Despite of trying to select an easy-reading writing 
style, there is still some academic words need to be explained in further. 
 
The organization of paper contents is as following. As our previous series of paper, Research 
literature and theories are covered in the first two sessions. Next, it followed by introduction 
of our research methodology in session 3 (3rd).  Continuously, session four (4) covers our 
familiar four (4) groups of empirical findings. And our conclusion and policy suggestion is 
covered in the fifth (5th) session. Before last, there are exhibit session which covers some 
summary of this paper’s analysis and comparison. And lastly, a glossary notes is provided 
with information for reference and because of reducing repeating terminology.  
 
2.  Research literature review 
 
There are many and controversial opinions on corporate governance theories and practices. 
For example, Jensen and Meckling (1976) presented their conceptual agency theory on the 
separation of ownership and management. Lin, Andrew Jen-Guang (2007) pointed that 
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Corporate Governance will maintain its vital position in corporate law and securities law with 
the simple focus on investors. 
 
Besides, Commonwealth Association (1999) pointed the fact that every country and 
businesses nowadays need good corporate governance practices and theories as a necessity.   
 
Moreover, the South Africa King Code (2009) mentioned the terms of “corporate citizenship” 
and CSR or Corporate Social Responsibility and stated Corporate responsibility is the 
responsibility of the company for the impacts of its decisions and activities on society and the 
environment, through transparent and ethical behaviour that: contributes to sustainable 
development, including health and the welfare of society; 
 
Furthermore, Exhibit 4 shows us different parties and components, internal and external, 
should be involved in a policy or system of corporate governance. And certainly, global crisis 
and scandals recently such as Enron, Tyco, and Phidelphia partially signify the importance of 
corporate governance. As Demirag and Solomon, 2003 stated, The Asian crisis in 1997-1999 
and corporate scandals such as Barings and WorldCom enhanced the need for corporate 
governance reform at a global level.  
 
Additionally, Becht, Marco., Bolton, Patrick., Roel, Ailsa., (2005) developed corporate 
governance, the term is related with the resolution of collective action problems among 
dispersed investors, as well as the reconciliation of conflicts of interest between various 
corporate claimholders. They also pointed that when the outside investors have conflicts of 
interest with and want to exercise control differently from what the managers do, it will be 
among causes of corporate governance problems. Moreover, Adams, Renee B., Hermalin, 
Benjamin E., and Weisbach, Michael S., (2009) realized that as a consequence of corporate 
scandals and relevant corporate governance issues, boards have been at the center of the 
policy debate concerning governance reform and many further researches should deal with it. 
Then, Fong (2013) stated disclosure of corporate information forms an integral part of the 
corporate governance framework. And Edmans (2013) pointed blockholders (large 
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shareholders) may also worsen governance by extracting private benefits of control or 
pursuing objectives other than firm value maximization. 
 
Because there are not many researches and surveys done in European groups, next, what is 
the limited comparative standardized set of so-called comparative European group corporate 
governance standards? 
 
Theory of Corporate Governance, Scandal and Market Manipulation 
 
Theory of manipulation 
 
There are different views on Manipulation subjects because of different types of it.   
Besides, the involvement of financial intermediaries and brokers may contribute to 
manipulate market price while maintaining their credibility.   
 
Also there were several corporate scandals around the world, happening together with market 
manipulation with reasons coming from artificially inflating accounting revenue or income, as 
well as the share prices of distressed companies to benefit the values of shareholders and 
investors and MGT team, and strengthening the co.’s financial statements as well. Regarding 
to reasons for corporate scandals, such as Enron, there is a matter relevant to external auditor 
roles, responsibilities in general and in their communication and transparency with the Board 
and with the company, as well as full duties to shareholders. Last but not least, there is a role 
of speculators in manipulation transactions to cause the increasing in investment flow into the 
invested company when speculators produce enough, or as much and sufficient as possible, 
information.  
 
Theory of corporate governance and financial crisis 
 
First, Exhibit 4 showed us a general model of corporate governance with main parties such as: 
shareholders, board, committees, financialist, other stakeholders and community in a market 
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economy and society. It identifies several criteria to build a good CG in organization such as: 
stakeholder involvement, policies and procedures which we aim to analyze in later sessions. 
And, as Shleifer and Vishy (1997) stated corporate governance regarding to the ways in 
which suppliers of finance to corporations assure themselves of getting a return on their 
investment. 
 
Also, Rachel., IFC (2009) stated that good CG is in companies with longer term sustainability 
and moreover, we need companies achieving environmental, social and economic value for 
society.  
 
Last but not least, corporate governance nowadays is researched in a total picture of 
globalization. While globalization deals with the ways in which goods, products and services 
are exchanged in cross-countries, corporate governance pays attention on how the company 
structure and governance mechanisms are enhanced to meet the demands of such these trends. 
In other words, corporate governance in a globalization trend has many things to work with 
building a good internal system and quality flows of information inside the business to face 
the challenges which comes from the external factors of globalization. 
 
Hence, we can see, there exist various views on corporate governance and its importance.  
 
3. Research methodology 
 
Firstly, we analyze and compare corporate governance principles in each of two (2) different 
groups including: 1) Group 1 – European group CG representative standards including EASD 
CG 2000 and ECODA 2010 Corporate Governance Principles; and 2) Group 2 - Relatively 
good corporate governance group including EFAMA Code 2011 and EBRD Corporate 
Practices 1997;  
 
We also use, but not limited to, international standards of corporate governance such as: 
World Bank, and Mc Kinsey corporate governance principles and surveys as reference, as 
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well as ICGN and OECD Corporate Governance Principles which have many modifications 
in corporate governance principles after the crisis period. 
 
Then, we suggest on what so-called limited comparative European Group corporate 
governance principles which is aiming to create a basic background for relevant corporations 
interesting in different aspects of corporate governance subjects and functions as the 
recommendation to relevant countries’ government and other relevant organizations for public 
policy and necessary evaluation.  
 
Last but not least, for a summary of our standards, see Exhibit and the below table 1 and 2 in 
relevant sessions. 
 
4. Empirical findings 
 
A- Findings on Corporate governance issues after financial crisis, corporate scandals and 
market manipulation 
Several popular issues including: the responsibility of the Board of Directors, both as a whole 
and as individual, to the mission of protecting and growing net value of total company asset. 
This is clearly identified after many crises and scandals recently. To break this issue in more 
details, we can see there is the un-effectiveness of Board, CEO and Board processes, as well 
as the inefficiency roles of audit function in dealing with matters relevant to Board 
effectiveness. 
 
Also, we can find out another corporate governance (CG) issue. It is, the lack of effective 
mechanism to protect well net value of company and investors and shareholders’ asset and 
investment. Another one is the transparency mechanism still existing with errors that lead to 
declining company’s credibility to investors.  
 
Moreover, the lack of an effective Code of Ethics and Code of Conduct might be a cause 
contributing to failures, frauds and bankruptcy recently and after financial crisis time. 
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B- Findings on Ways of Manipulation during Corporate Scandals 
Several Manipulation Techniques found out during corporate scandals involve, but not limited 
to: 
 
B.1 – The manipulation techniques in the income statement: 
Here, the technique is used to manipulate either income or expense or profit to maximize 
benefits for both Board and investors.  
 
Or, the company may establish a subsidiary to hide the actual losses in its business. For 
example, in the scandal of a financial giant in Japan, Yamaichi securities co., in 1992, the 
Yamaichi subsidiary used dummy companies to generate earnings for customers while 
eventually receiving losses of 158.3 billion yen.  
 
B.2 - The manipulation techniques in both the income statement and balance sheet: 
In the case of BCCI, Bank of Credit and Commerce International, found in Pakistan, there is 
accounting falsification of an amount of $13 b which is unaccounted.  
 
Furthermore, in the scandal of Riccar, a leading Japanese sewing machine manufacturer, there 
is a manipulation of earnings. The company had bad inventory and gave a fictitious sale 
invoice to false customers and hid the corresponding merchandise in warehouse, which are 
treated as sold merchandise, then, the inventory was not recorded in the books and was, in 
effect, an off-balance sheet asset. Riccard reported a fictitious revenue of 53.6 billion yen in 
total from 1976 to 1984.  
 
B.3 - The manipulation techniques relevant to international accounting practice code: 
 
There is also a going controversial concern between some different practices in IFRs and 
GAAP standards, although we know that IFRS has quality requirements for recognition, 
measurement. Moreover, in the scandal of ABB in Sweden, the company switched from IAS 
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to US GAAP accounting in order to be listed on NYSE in 2001. Whereas IAS allowed the 
loss could be distributed over many years, under US GAAP, gains and losses of business 
transactions were allocated for the financial years they occurred.  
 
B.4 - Other manipulation techniques net belong to above classifications: 
Insider trading can be a source of market manipulation. For example, information on good 
business opportunities, which contains uncertainty and risks in future, or information on 
probability of winning auction of company can be an attribute to market price manipulation. 
In the case of Martha Stewart scandal in 2001, the responsible manager is accused of using 
insider trading to trade nearly four thousand shares of stocks after receiving non-public 
information from one broker in order to avoid a big loss, just one day before that firm’s stock 
price plummeted.  
 
C- Actions on Preventing or Controlling negative manipulation 
As management can perform false accounting and manipulation because of their own benefits 
or satisfying investors’ expectation, a governance mechanism need to be established to 
control or prevent these actions. 
Beside, in order to control negative market manipulation, necessary actions are enhancing 
mechanisms of internal audit and internal control.  
  
D- Findings on Construction of Comparative International Corporate Governance 
Standards 
 
These findings will be shown in a detailed analysis of a model indicated in the later sessions. 
 
<D.1> - Group 1 – European Group Corporate Governance standards analysis 
 
The EASD Principles of Corporate Governance 2000  
 
This is the Code of European Association of Securities Dealers. 
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Among its advantages are, but not limited to, the concentration on the substance of GM 
discussion. 
 
Additionally, it is good to state that shareholders as individuals or groups have different 
objectives which differ from companies that perform roles in societies. 
 
Besides, it identifies distinction between interests of the company and those of shareholders. 
Generally speaking, The Code considers CG as a concept evolving over time and space.  
However, it would be better to address disclosure and transparency (see Exhibit 1). 
 
The Corporate Governance Principles for Unlisted Companies in Europe 2010 
 
The Code is developed by The European Confederation of Directors Association (ECODA). 
The Code identified the global crisis highlighted the importance of applying good practices. 
One of its distinctions is mentioning shareholders set proper governance framework for the 
company. And it also pointed conflicts of interest can undermine CG. 
For more information, please see Exhibit 3. However, it would be better to clarify roles of a 
compliance officer. 
 
Comparison between the ECODA and EASD Corporate Governance Principles 
 
There is a focus in EASD Code on BD meeting with background information should be given 
for the meeting. Moreover, it states directors could propose agenda items. Also, it makes a 
sound point when it recpmmended price-sensitive information be withheld by the company.   
 
On the other hand, the ECODA Code considers a proactive relationship between shareholders 
and BD at crisis time and normal business time. Besides, it also considers risk in case the 
company does not incorporate interests of stakeholders into CG. 
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Table 1 – A so-called European group CG representative standards 
Subjects or parties Main quality factors Sub quality factors 
Audit committee Chairman be non-executive board member; Advisory authority delegated by 
BD; BD delegate responsibilities; 
CEO and The Chair Chair ensure effectiveness of communication 
b.t shareholders and BD; 
Chair ensure BD operate 
efficiently; 
Corporate Secretary Record the minutes, monitor conformity with 
BD procedures, implementation of policy 
decisions; 
Ensure board receive information in 
a timely way; 
Compliance officer N/A (for further research and implementation) N/A (for further research and 
implementation) 
Board of Directors Independent of MGT, influential shareholders; 
Set the company values and standards; 
Must meet at least once every 6 
months or at least once every 3 
months; 
Independent director Ensure MGT team take correct step and use 
resources in the most efficient manner; 
Independent BD member may own 
some shares but not join in pension 
plans or stock option; 
Supervisory board to the 
Management 
BD supervise MGT; N/A (for further research and 
implementation) 
Supervisory to the 
Board of Directors 
Advisory board may be an interim step of BD; Over time advisory board members 
can join BD; 
Internal control Provide for integrity of corporate data; Supported by procedures of 
Authorization limits, Control over 
assets; 
Internal audit BD take care of; Reliable and understandable 
information; 
External audit Shareholders approve EA; present at GM; Inform BD findings regard to IC; 
Disclosure and 
transparency 
Establish the legitimacy of firm as a 
responsible firm in society; 
Relevant, timely, understandable; 
Shareholders Elect/remove board members; Have prompt access to information 
on the substance of the discussion; 
The corporation as a 
whole entity 
Develop company manual with anti-fraud, 
record MGT; 
Scale and complexity of firm affect 
board size and composition; 
 
<D.2> -Group 2 – Relative Good Corporate governance group analysis 
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2011 EFAMA Code for External Governance analysis: 
 
Good recommendations involved in the 1999 CACG Code include, but not limited to, a strong 
link between CG and investment process.  And it is based on good judgment rather than 
description. 
 
A minor point might be noted here is that the audit and control system are not described. For a 
summarized analysis on corporate governance factors, please refer to the Exhibit 5.   
 
In summary, the 2011 Code paid well attention to enhancing quality of communication with 
clients or investee companies.   
 
 
 
 
Sound business standards and corporate practices 1997 analysis: 
 
These practices are prepared by EBRD (European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development). 
 
In the 1997 Code, we recognized it pays attention to establishing stable relationship with 
stakeholders based on sound behaviour and practices.  
 
And among its advantages is that it mentions as the key aspect of CG, shareholders can 
oversee MGT performance and join in key decisions. Please refer to Exhibit 6. 
 
On the other hand, it has a disadvantage as it does not describe well duties of CEO and the 
Chair. 
 
Comparison between the EFAMA Code and 1997 Corporate Practices 
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First of all, there is a focus in the 2011 EFAMA Code encourage meeting with CEO, 
supervisory board chairman of investee companies to enhance value.    
 
Beside, The 1997 Corporate Practices pointed Shareholder Assembly role is to approve 
changes in activities or decision in reorganization.  
 
The 1st Establishment of so-called relatively Good Corporate Governance standards 
 
This following table is built with the summary of above CG standards. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2 – A relatively Good Corporate Governance standards 
Subjects or parties Main quality factors Sub quality factors 
Audit committee N/A (for further research and implementation) N/A (for further research and 
implementation) 
CEO and The Chair BD select CEO and monitor his/her 
performance; 
N/A (for further research and 
implementation) 
Corporate Secretary N/A (for further research and implementation) N/A (for further research and 
implementation) 
Compliance officer N/A (for further research and implementation) N/A (for further research and 
implementation) 
Board of Directors Active dialogue with investee companies; Independent from MGT; elected for 
a strict term of office; 
Independent director N/A (for further research and implementation) N/A (for further research and 
implementation) 
Supervisory board to the 
Management 
N/A (for further research and implementation) N/A (for further research and 
implementation) 
Supervisory to the 
Board of Directors 
N/A (for further research and implementation) N/A (for further research and 
implementation) 
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Internal control Report conflicts of interest affecting BD, 
MGT; 
Processes to secure effective 
control of business; 
Internal audit Auditing the compliance with internal 
procedures; 
Monitor professional good business 
practice; 
External audit Examine the integrity of financial system; Independent; audit the accounts; 
Disclosure and 
transparency 
Have a policy on external governance 
disclosure; 
Not make disclosure that might be 
counterproductive;  
Shareholders Adequate policy on voting rights; Oversee MGT 
performance; join in key 
decision; 
The corporation as a 
whole entity 
enhancing quality of communication with 
clients or investee companies 
Have a fiduciary duty to 
clients/investors; 
 
D.3- The 1st Establishment of so-called limited comparative European Group Corporate 
Governance standards 
 
Comparison of corporate governance standards between<D.1> and <D.2> group  
 
Before we come to set up a set of general limited standards of corporate governance, we need 
to review the standards combined in the previous two (2) groups  
 
The advantages of Group 1, but not limited to, roles of Chair and CEO (see above Table 1). 
 
On the contrary, the relative Good Corporate Governance Group standards states the company 
need to identify problems at early stages to minimize any loss of value.   
 
A so-called Limited Comparative European Corporate Governance Set of standards 
 
Based on the above analysis, we consider building comparative standards for a comparative 
European Group Corporate Governance system.   
 
Table 2 - The Comparative European Group Corporate Governance standards 
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Subjects or parties Main quality factors Sub quality factors 
Audit committee Chairman be non-executive board 
member; 
Advisory authority delegated by BD; BD 
delegate responsibilities; 
Nominating committee evaluate the balance of skill, 
knowledge, experience of board; 
Advisory authority delegated by 
BD; 
Lead the process for board appointment; BD 
delegate responsibilities; 
Numeration or 
Compensation 
Committee 
Define and monitor structure of 
remuneration for senior MGT; 
Advisory authority delegated by BD; BD 
delegate responsibilities; 
CEO and The Chair Chair recognize strengths and 
address weakness of the board, 
propose new board member;  
Chair ensure BD operate efficiently, ensure 
BD receive timely, clear information; 
CFO N/A (for further research and 
implementation) 
N/A (for further research and implementation) 
Corporate Secretary Ensure board receive information in 
a timely way; 
Record the minutes, monitor conformity with 
BD procedures, implementation of policy 
decisions; 
Compliance officer N/A (for furtherresearch and 
implementation) 
N/A (for further research and implementation) 
Board of Directors or 
Management Board 
Set the company values and 
standards; smaller size increases 
communication quality; 
Must meet at least once every months or at 
least once every 3 months; 
Independent director Ensure MGT team take correct step 
and use resources in the most 
efficient manner; 
Independent BD member may own some 
shares but not join in pension plans or stock 
option; 
Supervisory board to the 
Management 
Over time , advisory board 
members can join BD; 
BD supervise MGT; 
Supervisory to the 
Board of Directors 
Advisory board may be an interim 
step of BD; 
Over time advisory board members can join 
BD; 
Internal control Provide for integrity of corporate 
data; Report conflicts of interest 
affecting BD, MGT; 
Supported by procedures of Authorization 
limits, Control over assets; 
Internal audit BD take care of; Auditing the 
compliance with internal 
procedures; 
Reliable and understandable information; 
External audit Shareholders approve EA; present 
at GM; 
Inform BD findings regard to IC; 
Disclosure and 
transparency 
Have a policy on external 
governance disclosure; Not make 
disclosure that might be 
Establish the legitimacy of firm as a 
responsible firm in society; 
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counterproductive; 
Shareholders BD have satisfactory dialogue with 
shareholders; 
Respect shareholder interests; may require 
ongoing dialogue with BD; 
Stakeholders BD establish a suitable program for 
stakeholder engagement;  
BD take care of CG and stakeholder policy; 
Accountability Directors usually declare potential 
conflicts of interest to BD; 
Insider trading is prohibited; 
Leadership Act by BD, Chair, CEO; BD is the primary decision-making body; 
Employee Justify their action to someone else; 
report unethical behaviour; 
Company organs properly address concerns of 
legitimate people; 
Family governance Family members may develop 
preferences for business; 
Outline vision, objectives of the family for 
business; prevent potential conflicts; 
3rd parties and conflicts 
of interests 
Handle issues around insider 
information; 
May appoint lawyer, accountant to ensure BD 
fulfill statutory duties; 
The corporation as a 
whole entity 
Have a fiduciary duty to 
clients/investors; 
Develop company manual with anti-fraud, 
record MGT; 
The Code Based on good judgement rather 
than description; 
Align interests of MGT with shareholders and 
stakeholders; 
(Note: source are based on corporate governance standards of group <D.1> and <D.2> and the appraisal of 
these standards) 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
Among several key corporate governance issues is, but not limited to, the leadership roles and 
the effectiveness of top management team, including CEO, chair, Board and outside directors.  
To reduce its impacts, The EASD Code suggested BD not only take care of stakeholder 
policies but also corporate ethics and behavior.   
 
Besides, the ECODA Code included a direct guidance for shareholders and directors as 
foundation for individual EU member. On the other hand, EFAMA Code 2011 mentioned 
effective policy for procedures for monitoring corporate events is needed. And 1997 
Corporate Practices stated BD roles including recommendations to shareholders on issues for 
voting. 
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Past surveys from McKinsey in 2000 showed results such as investors willing pay 24% 
premium for good CG in South Korea and 18% premium for that in UK.   
 
In consideration of corporate governance issues analyzed in the previous sessions, we 
proposed the main and sub quality factors in this paper a set of general comparative 
European group corporate governance standards in a limited model with selected codes. 
Though limited, it has some implications for further research and proper recommendations to 
relevant government and organizations. And it also provides relevant academic and non-
academic, lawyer and consultant, board and non-board people with minimum information for 
further researches. 
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Exhibit 
 
Exhibit 1 –   The EASD Principles of Governance for South Africa (a short summary 
evaluation) 
 
Subjects or 
parties 
Main quality 
factors 
Sub quality 
factors 
Responsibilities Objectives Note 
Audit committee Not mentioned 
clearly in the 
code; 
Chairman be non-
executive board 
member; 
Not mentioned 
clearly in the 
code; 
Not mentioned 
clearly in the 
code; 
As understood 
from the Code; 
Nomination 
committee 
Not mentioned 
clearly in the 
code; 
Balanced; Not mentioned 
clearly in the 
code; 
Not mentioned 
clearly in the 
code; 
As understood 
from the Code; 
Compensation or 
Remuneration 
committee 
Not mentioned 
clearly in the 
code; 
Chairman be non-
executive board 
member; 
Not mentioned 
clearly in the 
code; 
Not mentioned 
clearly in the 
code; 
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CEO or Lead 
director; 
Not mentioned 
clearly in the 
code; 
Not mentioned 
clearly in the 
code; 
Not mentioned 
clearly in the 
code; 
Not mentioned 
clearly in the 
code; 
 
The Chair Set BD meeting 
agenda; 
Ensure BD 
operate 
efficiently; 
Present at GM to 
answer questions 
or refer to BD; 
Not mentioned 
clearly in the 
code; 
 
CEO and The 
Chair relationship 
Not mentioned 
clearly in the 
code; 
Not mentioned 
clearly in the 
code; 
Separate in one-
tier board system; 
Not mentioned 
clearly in the 
code; 
As understood 
from the code; 
Corporate 
Secretary (CS) 
Not mentioned 
clearly in the 
code; 
Not mentioned 
clearly in the 
code; 
Record the 
minutes, monitor 
conformity with 
BD procedures, 
implementation of 
policy decisions; 
Not mentioned 
clearly in the 
code; 
 
Compliance 
officer 
(compliance) 
Not mentioned 
clearly in the 
code; 
Not mentioned 
clearly in the 
code; 
Not mentioned 
clearly in the 
code; 
Not mentioned 
clearly in the 
code; 
 
Board of Directors Good faith, due 
diligence, care 
and loyalty; 
Balanced; Orientation/ 
Monitor 
functions; Present 
at GM to answer 
questions; 
Long term 
interests of the 
co.; 
 
Executive director 
(EDs) 
Outside business 
activities 
approved by BD; 
On-going 
conflicts of 
interest must be 
avoided; 
Take care of 
senior executive 
nomination; 
Not mentioned 
clearly in the 
code; 
 
Non-executive 
director (NEDs) 
Not mentioned 
clearly in the 
code; 
Not mentioned 
clearly in the 
code; 
Remuneration 
based on BD 
policies; 
Not mentioned 
clearly in the 
code; 
 
(Senior) 
Independent 
director 
Not mentioned 
clearly in the 
code; 
Not mentioned 
clearly in the 
code; 
Independent BD 
member may own 
some shares but 
not join in pension 
plans or stock 
option; 
Not mentioned 
clearly in the 
code; 
 
CFO (senior 
financial officer) 
Not mentioned 
clearly in the 
code; 
Not mentioned 
clearly in the 
code; 
Not mentioned 
clearly in the 
code; 
Not mentioned 
clearly in the 
code; 
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Management team 
(senior) 
Accountable to 
BD, company, 
shareholders; 
Sufficient latitude;  Present at GM to 
answer questions; 
delegation of 
power and 
decisions by BD; 
Not mentioned 
clearly in the 
code; 
 
Supervisory board Not mentioned 
clearly in the 
code; 
Not mentioned 
clearly in the 
code; 
BD supervise 
MGT; 
Not mentioned 
clearly in the 
code; 
 
Internal control Not mentioned 
clearly in the 
code; 
BD take care of; Provide for 
integrity of 
corporate data; 
Not mentioned 
clearly in the 
code; 
 
Internal audit Not mentioned 
clearly in the 
code; 
BD take care of; Not mentioned 
clearly in the 
code; 
Not mentioned 
clearly in the 
code; 
 
External 
(Independent) 
audit /registered 
public accounting 
firm; 
Inform BD 
findings regard to 
IC; 
BD take care of; Shareholders 
approve EA; 
present at GM; 
Not mentioned 
clearly in the 
code; 
 
Disclosure and 
transparency 
Not mentioned 
clearly in the 
code; 
Relevant, timely, 
understandable; 
Not mentioned 
clearly in the 
code; 
Not mentioned 
clearly in the 
code; 
 
Shareholders and 
Minority 
Stockholder 
Controlling 
shareholders give 
due consideration 
to minority; 
Minority not 
restrain corporate 
action; 
Elect/remove 
board members; 
Not mentioned 
clearly in the 
code; 
 
Accountability Insider trading is 
prohibited; 
BD accountable to 
shareholders; 
Avoid/disclose 
conflicts of 
interests; 
Not mentioned 
clearly in the 
code; 
 
Leadership Not mentioned 
clearly in the 
code; 
Not mentioned 
clearly in the 
code; 
Act by BD, Chair, 
CEO; 
Not mentioned 
clearly in the 
code; 
 
Employee Not mentioned 
clearly in the 
code; 
Not mentioned 
clearly in the 
code; 
Company organs 
properly address 
concerns of 
legitimate people; 
Not mentioned 
clearly in the 
code; 
 
3rd parties and Not mentioned Related party Not mentioned Not mentioned  
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conflicts of 
interests 
clearly in the 
code; 
transaction 
disclosed; 
clearly in the 
code; 
clearly in the 
code; 
Code of ethics 
(conduct) 
Not mentioned 
clearly in the 
code; 
Not mentioned 
clearly in the 
code; 
BD take care of; Not mentioned 
clearly in the 
code; 
 
Group and 
subsidiaries 
Not mentioned 
clearly in the 
code; 
Not mentioned 
clearly in the 
code; 
Institutional 
investors state 
their voting 
policies; 
Not mentioned 
clearly in the 
code; 
 
Note The underlined part is describing some more works 
needed to be done for relevant subjects and parties.  
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Exhibit 2 – Corporate Governance system 
(source: Brazil Code of Best Practice of CG) 
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Exhibit 3 – Evaluation of 2010 ECODA Code Corporate Governance 
 
Subjects or 
parties 
Main quality 
factors 
Sub quality 
factors 
Responsibilitie
s 
Objectives Note 
Audit 
committee 
Advisory 
authority 
delegated by 
BD; 
BD delegate 
responsibilities; 
BD set 
appropriate BD 
committees;  
More effective 
discharge of its 
duties; 
 
Nomination 
(HR) committee 
Lead the 
process for 
board 
appointment; 
Clear distinction 
b.t ED and 
NED; 
BD delegate 
responsibilities; 
evaluate the 
balance of skill, 
knowledge, 
experience of 
board; Advisory 
authority 
delegated by 
BD; 
Not mentioned 
clearly by the 
Code; 
 
Compensation 
or 
Remuneration 
committee 
Propose 
remuneration 
for all 
executives; 
Define and 
monitor 
structure of 
remuneration 
for senior MGT; 
BD delegate 
responsibilities; 
Advisory 
authority 
delegated by 
BD; 
Not mentioned 
clearly by the 
Code; 
 
CEO BD supervise 
CEO; 
Exercise 
executive 
authority over 
operation; 
Leading 
executive MGT; 
consider as 
chief risk 
officer; board 
evaluate CEO; 
Not mentioned 
clearly by the 
Code; 
 
The Chair Prepare an 
agenda; too 
close to MGT 
will lack of 
objectivity and 
credibility; 
Lead board ; set 
agenda of 
annual 
meeting ; 
Welding 
capable 
individuals into 
board team; 
Chair recognize 
strengths and 
address 
weakness of the 
board, propose 
new board 
member; 
High 
performing 
board team; 
 
CEO and The 
Chair 
relationship 
Chairman 
encourage BD 
members  to 
take certified 
director 
qualification; 
After 
consultation 
with CEO and 
chairman, BD  
may find extra 
information 
from MGT; 
Responsibilities 
separated; 
Not mentioned 
clearly by the 
Code; 
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Corporate 
Secretary 
(Board) 
Not mentioned 
clearly by the 
Code; 
Report to chair 
and CEO; 
Help BD fulfill 
compliance 
schedule; 
Ensure board 
receive 
information in a 
timely way; 
 
Compliance 
officer 
Not mentioned 
clearly by the 
Code; 
Not mentioned 
clearly by the 
Code; 
Not mentioned 
clearly by the 
Code; 
Not mentioned 
clearly by the 
Code; 
 
Board of 
Directors 
Clear division 
b.t running BD 
and running co. 
business;  
Directors 
receive 
induction on 
joining BD, 
update 
skill/knowledge
; 
Risk oversights; 
define corporate 
strategy; 
For long term 
success of firm; 
As understood 
from the code; 
Executve 
director 
Not mentioned 
clearly by the 
Code; 
Full time; 1 or more may 
join one tier 
board; 
Not mentioned 
clearly by the 
Code; 
 
Non-executive 
(external)  
director 
Part time; add 
new skill 
/knowledge not 
available within 
firm; 
BD ensure NED 
have access to 
independent 
professional 
advice; 
Involve in one 
tier board; 
outside 
perspective on 
strategy and 
control; 
Not mentioned 
clearly by the 
Code; 
 
Independent 
director 
Not mentioned 
clearly by the 
Code; 
Not mentioned 
clearly by the 
Code; 
Joining:  A key 
step in 
development of 
unlisted firm; 
Ensure MGT 
team take 
correct step and 
use resources in 
the most 
efficient 
manner;  
 
CFO Not mentioned 
clearly by the 
Code; 
Not mentioned 
clearly by the 
Code; 
Not mentioned 
clearly by the 
Code; 
Not mentioned 
clearly by the 
Code; 
 
Management 
team (senior) 
Too much 
power, MGT 
will lose touch 
with BD; 
Not the firm key 
decision 
makers; 
BD  delegation 
authority to 
MGT; access to 
NED; 
  
Supervisory 
board 
Over time , 
advisory board 
members can 
join BD; 
w/o formal 
decision making 
duties; 
Advisory board 
may be an 
interim step of 
BD; include 
NED in 2 tier 
board; 
Not mentioned 
clearly by the 
Code; 
 
Internal control Take into 
account of 
financial, 
BD responsible 
for a sound  
formal IC and 
MGT establish 
IC and RM 
Not mentioned 
clearly by the 
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operational, 
strategic risks; 
RM; (delegated); Code; 
Internal audit Not mentioned 
clearly by the 
Code; 
Reliable and 
understandable 
information; 
Not mentioned 
clearly by the 
Code; 
Not mentioned 
clearly by the 
Code; 
 
External 
(Independent) 
audit 
Not mentioned 
clearly by the 
Code; 
Reliable and 
understandable 
information; 
Not mentioned 
clearly by the 
Code; 
Not mentioned 
clearly by the 
Code; 
 
Disclosure and 
transparency 
Not mentioned 
clearly by the 
Code; 
Not mentioned 
clearly by the 
Code; 
ED and NED 
compensation is 
transparent; 
Establish the 
legitimacy of 
firm as a 
responsible firm 
in society; 
 
Shareholders 
and Minority 
Stockholder 
Respect 
shareholder 
interests; may 
require ongoing 
dialogue with 
BD; 
BD have 
satisfactory 
dialogue with 
shareholders; 
set proper 
governance 
framework; 
enter 
agreements 
among 
themselves; 
Notmentioned 
clearly by the 
Code; 
 
Accountability Not mentioned 
clearly by the 
Code; 
Directors 
usually declare 
potential 
conflicts of 
interest to BD; 
Each employee, 
manager, BD 
member 
understand 
scope of their 
duties; 
Not mentioned 
clearly by the 
Code; 
As understood 
from the code; 
Leadership Not mentioned 
clearly by the 
Code; 
BD is the 
primary 
decision-
making body; 
Act by CEO; Not mentioned 
clearly by the 
Code; 
As understood 
from the code; 
Employee Staff 
recruitment and 
remuneration 
delegated to 
MGT; 
Justify their 
action to 
someone else; 
As one of key 
external 
stakeholders; 
Not mentioned 
clearly by the 
Code; 
 
3rd parties and 
conflicts of 
interests 
Not mentioned 
clearly by the 
Code; 
Academics, 
external think-
tanks  may 
support 
information for 
BD; 
May appoint 
lawyer, 
accountant to 
ensure BD 
fulfill statutory 
duties; 
Not mentioned 
clearly by the 
Code; 
 
Code of ethics 
(conduct) 
Not mentioned 
clearly by the 
Code; 
Support for 
employee 
personal 
development; 
CG align 
interests of 
MGT with 
shareholders 
and 
Not mentioned 
clearly by the 
Code; 
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stakeholders; 
Group and 
subsidiaries 
Not mentioned 
clearly by the 
Code; 
Group appraisal 
examine how 
boardoperates 
as a collective 
decision-
making body; 
Not mentioned 
clearly by the 
Code; 
Not mentioned 
clearly by the 
Code; 
 
Note The underlined part is describing some more works 
needed to be done for relevant subjects and parties.   
 
